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Vision, Image and Symbol 
Homo Pictor and Animal Symbolicum in Hans Jonas’  
Anthropology 
Fabio Fossa 
1. Vision and the «animality» of man 
At first glance, it seems quite reasonable to classify Hans Jonas' thoughts on man as an 
aesthetical anthropology. In 1963, after almost four decades dedicated to the study of 
Gnosticism, Jonas published a book, Zwischen Nichts und Ewigkeit. Zur Lehre vom 
Menschen (Jonas 1963). He collected there three essays, previously issued on different 
reviews1 between the early Fifties and the early Sixties2. The themes discussed in these 
essays did not concern Gnosis any longer, but contemporary philosophy. In fact, 
Gnosticism showed an unexpected similarity to the modern way of considering the 
world and man as a part of it. In Jonas’ opinion, a critique of Gnosticism could emphasize 
some weaknesses of modern thought, and outline the guidelines towards a new 
challenge in philosophical thinking. As he explained in Gnosticism and modern Nihilism, 
clarifying the relationship between man and being is critical to overcome any dualistic 
ontology that either condemns man to an unbearable solitude, or wards him off to a 
naturalistic monism where he might lose his peculiar features. The essence of man is 
once more the real issue at stake. In other words, a review of Gnosticism in the light of 
 
1
 The first essay, Gnosis, Existentialismus und Nihilismus was previously published in English as 
Jonas (1952); the second, Die Freiheit des Bildens. Homo pictor und die differentia des Mensches, 
appeared as Jonas (1961) (from which I extract the German quotes) and in English as Jonas 
(1962a). The third, Unsterblichkeit und heutige Existenz, was firstly published as Jonas (1962b). 
2 
It was a very fecund period for Hans Jonas. During these years he wrote most of the essays that 
later became part of The Phenomenon of Life. Among others, Causality and Perception (1950), 
Materialism and the Theory of Organism (1951), Is God a Mathematician? (1951), Motility and 
Emotion (1953), A Critique of Cibernetics (1953), The Nobility of Sight (1953-4), and The Practical 
Uses of Theory (1959). A thorough analysis of them can be found in R. Franzini Tibaldeo (2009).  
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the modern thought underlines the need for a new philosophical anthropology3. 
Furthermore, it makes clear that any theory of man aiming at overcoming a dualistic 
ontology must address two preconditions. Firstly, man should not be considered as 
separated from the context in which he happens to exist, i.e., the natural world. Some 
kind of continuity between nature and human being must be discovered. Secondly, 
despite the affinity between the two, man should be considered as a distinguished 
citizen of the realm of nature. His distinctive trait, or traits, must be identified and 
examined, in order to protect the peculiar phenomenon of man from the undetermined 
stream of nature4. This is the challenge Jonas has taken on in the second essay, on which 
we are going to focus: Image-making and the Freedom of Man. 
The aesthetical features of Jonas' anthropology seem undeniable. The primary 
question that opens the essay addresses the specific evidence that allows recognition of 
humanity beyond any physical affinity. Physical affinity is indeed too weak a criterion to 
define the essence of man. On the contrary, such evidence ought to be simple, primitive 
and unmistakeable. Jonas finds an answer to the question in the ability to draw and 
recognise pictures. Whenever we see a picture on a cavern wall, we can be sure that 
only one kind of being could have drawn it, i.e., man. No animal could have been its 
author, since there is no biological purpose in the act of image making [Bildmachen, 
Bilden]. Therefore, whoever is capable of drawing a picture, is also capable of acting 
beyond the immediate responses of natural instinct, following his own purposes. One 
could well argue that this being produces useless things, but it is probably more 
appropriate to say that he is expressing a new type of interest or freedom. This interest is 
inconceivable by means of mere biological categories. The freedom it represents is the 
highest stage of mediacy [Mittelbarkeit] in relation to the object, unknown to any other 
being but man. It is freedom from the influence of the surrounding environment. 
Something else is at work here, and this is exactly the differentia specifica of man. As far 
as this ability of producing pictures, and recognising them as pictures, is the quality that 
eminently inherits to man, and thereby defines it as such, a first conclusion is that the 
above described theory can be classified as an aesthetical anthropology. 
Naturally, the issue is far more complex. The role of pictures and the act of picture-
 
3
 This argument is splendidly proposed again in the first paragraph of Jonas (1996). The second 
paragraph is a summary of the essay on the homo pictor. 
4 
Cfr. Jonas (2001): 234: «whether a third road is open to it - one by which the dualistic rift can be 
avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man - philosophy 
must find out». 
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making need further clarifications, in order to discuss whether aesthetical concepts really 
are indispensable to conceive man along with Jonas or not. The first step in this direction is 
to examine, «which faculties and attitudes [Vermögen und Haltungen]» (Jonas [2001]: 
158). are required to make pictures, or even images [Bild]. Jonas feels no need to be 
systematic or thorough. He outlines a theory of human faculties that deserves to be 
analysed to properly understand the uniqueness of man and his relationship to animals 
and life in general. By reorganising his reflections upon a large set of objects such as vision, 
image faculty, symbol and so forth, I intend to retrace the structure of these acts that, 
according to Jonas, belong exclusively to man. Only then will it be possible to evaluate the 
exact role played by aesthetical themes in his theory of man. 
As already mentioned, human beings ought not be conceived as separate from their 
natural background. Therefore, the research shall move from human belonging to animal 
life. Man shares with animals a particular way to relate to the external world, a starting 
common level of mediacy in the relation to the object: the sense perception 
[Sinneswahrnehmung]. An analysis of the sense perception will uncover the joint 
grounds on which the peculiar features of man may arise. In the field of perception the 
«givenness of reality» (Jonas [2001]: 167) shows itself to the subject, not only as an 
amount of qualities, but also as something that co-exists with the self. The actual content 
of sense perception is the determinate existence of objects beyond the perceiving self. 
Still, perception shall not be considered as mere receptivity5. Vision [Gesichtsinn], for 
instance, is more than a simple collection of data. While it certainly offers a range of 
information that no other sense could retain, it also contributes to structure these 
evidences into visual shapes [visuelle Form] of an object: its «aspects [Aspekte]» (Jonas 
[2001]: 162). However, if the visual shapes may vary with perception, the form of the 
object does not change, which allows recognition6.  
It appears, then, that sight is already performing a representative function. By 
organizing data in streams of variable aspects, vision is able to structure its contents in 
discernible sets of experience. It then subsumes the multiplicity of its collection under 
 
5 
Cfr. Jonas (2001): 152-156. On these themes see also Franzini Tibaldeo (2009): 213-242. 
6 
Therefore, memory doesn't play any role in the act of recognition. Past memories cannot be of 
some help in identifying things, since they should be exactly the same of the contents of actual 
perception. On the contrary, the series of possible transformations of the object’s visual aspects 
allows to attribute the actual perception to a configuration. The term “form”, here, ought not be 
intended as usually (an intellectual product); the author means a visual product, that has to do 
with the proportion of parts in a fix configuration. Hence, there is no conceptual “form” ongoing 
in vision, but a primitive, utterly optical, organization process. 
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«an idea of “form”» (Jonas [2001]: 162)7 that has visual features exclusively. That «idea 
of “form”» should be conceived of as a pattern including every possible transformation 
in the object’s appearance. Due to this particular concept of form, the single datum leads 
to the recognition of what it stands for since it is part of an object's visual pattern. It 
implies that the several aspects are images of the object, since they recall it «through a 
likeness that comprehends unlikeness» (Jonas [2001]: 169], which is the essence of the 
representational function8. Each view can be regarded as a symbol, a way to reach unity 
and permanence out of a manifold. So, Jonas argues, sight may be «the home ground of 
abstraction» (Jonas [2001]: 162]. It is very unusual that abstraction, traditionally an act 
of intellect, is now associated with sense perception in general, and vision specifically. 
What does Jonas mean here by abstraction? How is it possible that a sense such as sight 
can ever perform a similar act? 
Jonas interprets the term lato sensu as an act of detachment, «disengagement 
[Absehen]» (Jonas [2001]: 168) from intrusive circumstances during an encounter. This 
act consents to deal with the phenomenon at hand in a different manner, according to 
purposes that go beyond the encounter itself. Vision performs a double abstraction. 
Firstly, it overlooks that each of its item is, directly at least, a sensory stimulation, an 
organic affection, and not a real object that exists independently. Nonetheless, we 
perceive the external world as something that stands by itself, conforming to its own 
way. In fact, sense perception is able to neutralize the «felt affectiveness» (ibidem] of its 
connection to the outward, thereby allowing the object to present itself (i.e., 
objectivity). Jonas names it «dynamic neutralization» (Jonas [2001]: 145-149). Secondly, 
vision (and to a certain extent perception altogether) disregards the irreducible 
 
7
 In a certain grade, even touch may reach a formal synthesis. Anyway, it is possible thanks to 
vision, or better thanks to the image-faculty that is partially active in sight. Blind men are able to 
«see» by touch not because touch might offer the same performance than sight, but since they 
are «endowed with the general faculty of “vision”», though they lack sight. Cfr. Jonas (2001): 135-
156. 
8 
I very briefly recall that the first paragraph of Jonas' essay is dedicated to a phenomenology of 
image. It consists of the following claims: 1. Images exhibit a likeness, 2. produced with intent, 3. 
that is not complete (an image is not an imitation). 4. This incompleteness marks an omission, a 
selection of the object's most representative features. 5. Hence, the image includes a 
representational function based on a symbolic similitude. 6. Aim of this function is the object 
visual shape. 7. Image existence is nondynamical, it stays in a nontransient and timeless present: 
images embody an ideal element. So, 8. image is an ideal entity that overcomes its real support 
(the imaging thing) and its real reference (the imaged object), «connecting them in the unique 
way of representation» Cfr. Jonas (2001): 164. The essence of images is the imaging function, or 
better representational function. 
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singularity of every perceived state of things, granting the object its identity along the 
range of its different visual aspects. Hence, abstraction performs a sort of detachment 
from the immediacy of sense, obtaining a new approach to its objects. In these terms, in 
addition to consciousness, abstraction might also be attributed to some highly evolved 
perceptual systems: almost as an «automatism», an operative function [Leistung der 
Abstraktion]. Since both perception and vision are faculties that man shares with other 
living beings, it is possible to attribute that capacity also to higher animals. At the same 
time, it contains the seeds of a further evolution: «abstraction, representation, 
symbolism - something of the image function» (Jonas [2001]: 170)9, that will fully 
develop only among humans. Vision, or sight, along with its characteristic «mechanism» 
of abstraction, is the link between human beings and their natural background. At the 
same time, it is the bud of the essence of man. 
2. Image  
In quest of the essence of man, the primitive, unequivocal and simple clue lays in the 
relationship with images. Vision, as mentioned, discloses something of this bond, hinting 
at the image function which fully appears exclusively among human beings. What in 
vision played a merely operative role (abstraction and the representational function), is 
now coming to surface. It is consciously grasped and reproduced. Humans establish a 
singular connection to images and representations, which no other organism shares. 
Therefore, this connection needs to be analysed carefully. Firstly, it is important to 
understand which «faculties and attitudes [Vermögen und Haltungen]»10 are involved in 
the relation to images. At this point, Jonas introduces a chief concept in his reflection on 
man. Human beings happen to bear a relationship to images, therefore the ability to 
consider images has to be counted among proper human acts; or better, it could be 
stated that man is provided with an image faculty [Bildvermögen]. Moreover, since the 
core of images is the representational function, and the image faculty takes images for its 
own objects, it could be called representational faculty as well. In addition, Jonas usually 
uses the word “picture” to refer to actual images (paintings, cave art and so forth), and 
 
9
 Cfr. Jonas (2001): 136: «The unique distinction of sight consists in what we may provisionally call 
the image-performance, where “image” implies these three characteristics: 1. simultaneity in the 
presentation of a manifold, 2. neutralization of the causality of sense-affection, 3. distance in the 
spatial and mental senses». Cfr. Jonas (2001): 184: «But sight, as the Sixth Essay has shown, 
contains trans-animal potentialities of beholding and attitude which a higher mental faculty can 
actualize». 
10
 Cfr. Jonas (2001): 158. See also Franzini Tibaldeo (2009): 243-291. 
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the word “image” to refer to the ideal content displayed by a picture. The difference 
between the two is, anyhow, quite subtle. Hence, Jonas sometimes uses the expression 
“pictorial faculty”. Image faculty, representational faculty, pictorial faculty are almost 
synonyms; they all indicate a possible relationship between human beings and images. 
Image faculty, then, can be analysed in its own features starting from the features of its 
object, the image. Namely, it has to be asked what «properties [Eigenschaften] are 
required in a subject» (Jonas [2001]: 165) in order to deal with images. The 
phenomenology of image, developed by Jonas in the beginning of the essay, may then 
subsequently guide the research towards the faculty that grasps images. This faculty 
should be able to get the qualities that define images. So, how is the image faculty 
organised or structured? Which are its distinctive acts, and which essential truth on man 
may they reveal? 
First of all, the image faculty includes two types of act: beholding images [Auffassen], 
and making images [Machen]. Although the tasks they conduct are different from each 
other, these two acts are substantially equal, i.e., their possibility is set in the same 
capacity: the ability to deal with images. Note that one implies the other. As these two 
constitute the connections achievable between a self and an image, they are the 
modalities into which the image faculty organises itself. Take the act of beholding 
images. Beholding images means, precisely, to «behold something as an image [etwas als 
ein Bild wahrnehmen]» (ibidem), and since images are the utterance of a likeness, this 
act is founded on «the ability to perceive likeness [das Vermögen Ähnlichkeit 
wahrnehmen]»(ibidem). Yet, likeness has to be perceived as «mere likeness [bloße 
Ähnlichkeit]» (Jonas [2001]: 166). This job oversteps animal capabilities. It is not just a 
matter of sharpness of sense perception. Something else, something more important, is 
involved in this particular kind of recognition. In fact, animals cannot grasp likeness such. 
On the contrary, as they get in touch with an object that utters a likeness, either that 
likeness is not noticed, or they take the object for what it represents. Animals can 
perceive «either sameness or otherness, but not both in one, as we do in the 
apprehension of similitude» (ibidem). Hence, the apprehension of likeness steps out of 
mere perception, and opens a new dimension in the mediacy relationship between 
subject and object: a «conceptual dimension [begriffliche Dimension]» (ibidem)11. As far 
 
11
 I think that «concept» (Begriff), and eidos too, ought not be read as usual but, yet again, «in a 
somewhat stretched sense of the term», cfr. Jonas (2001: 168), as a mental content different from 
a perceptive content. The dissimilarity between the two, as of now not that clear, is going to be 
analysed. 
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as the real components of the representational function are held together by the ideal 
image link, likeness is discerned as it is. This connection to images shows, therefore, that 
man can relate to an ideal element, in addition to real objects. That ability exceeds the 
performance of perception. 
What is required, then, to grasp mere likeness? On the one hand, the imaging object, 
i.e. the physical support, has to be discerned from the image it represents. On the other, 
the self must be able to distinguish the image from the imaged object, i.e. the 
representation itself from the represented thing (likeness shall not turn into illusion). 
Hence, likeness is perceived as a reference, and image as an ideal object that stands for 
something else (a real object, an intent). In the apprehension of likeness, consequently, 
the actual perception of real objects is overcome by an ideal link, «the similitude or 
eidos as such». An image consists in its representational function. The term eidos, here, 
is to be intended in the broad sense of the word, as mental content. Perceiving likeness 
allows the proper quality of human mediacy to appear, that is: the capability of «the 
mental separation of form from matter [die intentionale Trennung von Form und Stoff]» 
(Jonas [2001]: 167). In this «new level of mediacy [neue Ebene der Mittelbarkeit]» (Jonas 
[2001]: 170) an unprecedented freedom manifests itself. Any eidos, any mental element 
can be held back by the self in spite of the actual presence of the object it represents in 
the range of perception. Appearance [Erscheinung] springs up, as a different dimension 
from what is actually real; and the self, the human organism, acknowledges the latter as 
a strict cause-and-effect order, whereas he discovers the «free possession [freie 
Verfügung]» of the former. 
Freedom of detachment, Jonas argues, is freedom of control. Once the eidos is made 
independent from its real basis, then it becomes an ideal entity as such, under the 
command of the self. This type of control upon mental contents is initially experienced 
due to imagination [Einbildungskraft, Imagination] and its peculiar correlation to 
memory [Gedächtnis]. While animal memory is tied to sensation, in the sense that the 
recollection process is always bounded to a real element (need, perception, appetite), 
human memory is able to focus freely on what it prefers. In other words, animal memory 
seems to exhibit utterly circumstantial working principles12. On the contrary, human 
 
12
 Hence, we cannot be sure that animals are endowed with something as a «past». The set of 
recollections, which takes part in animal interaction to the environment, may not be intended by 
animals as past experiences at all, but just as knowledge of cause-and-effect patterns. I would like 
to notice that the matter of autonomy or eteronomy of animal behaviour is not at stake here. 
Jonas is not arguing that, since the environment plays an active role in animal recalling processes, 
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memory can relate to its object freely: It is gifted with a «freely reproductive faculty 
[freie Reproduktionsvermögen]» (Jonas [2001]: 171)13, imagination. Imagination has 
recollections, which are images of things, under its command. And its power has no 
limit. It can associate, dismember, and alter them at its own sake. Under this regard, 
thanks to abstraction, the application of imagination to memory completes the 
detachment performed by vision. At this new level of work, abstraction appears in all its 
power. This free attitude that imagination undertakes has no regards to reality. The 
possession of the object, as a remembered eidos, does not depend any longer on its 
actual occurrence, but it is always at self-disposal, so that it can ponder things at its call. 
This is the most simple and striking application of the capability that defines human 
essence, as it has been seen: the power to separate form from matter, eidos from reality. 
At this stage, we need to take a step back. The analysis of beholding images has led to 
the threshold of something that seems to be far more demanding than the plain study of 
image faculty. Before engaging with the crucial problem of Trennung, the ability of 
making images still awaits to be inspected. As will be demonstrated, the study of making 
images points to the same direction. Firstly, the capability of making images has a 
physical side that must not be underestimated. By making pictures man presents a highly 
adaptable and accurate control over the movements of its body. A type of control that 
stems precisely from the guidance of an image, a mental project, a model that requires 
to be realized. The ability to guide a body to fulfil self-chosen purposes is the 
precondition to any kind of human technology. Only man can rely on the «eidetic control 
of motility [eidetische Kontrolle der Motilität]» (Jonas [2001]: 172), and move his limbs 
beyond any strict pattern, but «by freely chosen, internally represented and purposely 
projected form» (ibidem). Form, as a mental content drawn from matter and its 
becoming that can be further elaborated by the self, comes back to the stream of reality 
thanks to the human activity it supervises. It is obvious, then, that eidetic control of 
 
then animal behaviour is completely explicable by cause-and-effect patterns. The thesis, here, is 
as following: Whereas, in animal life, perception and memory are on the same level, being equally 
linked to reality («At any rate, the “recalling” is done not by the subject but by circumstances for 
the subject», cfr. Jonas (2001): 165), in human life imagination allows to elaborate the contents of 
memory in a manner that exhibits a certain grade of independence from the performance of 
perception, that is from reality itself. That does not mean that animal behaviour is reducible to a 
strict cause-and-effect pattern. Cfr, Jonas (1953). 
13
 Similar observations in reference to the «image-function of sight» in Cfr. Jonas (2001: 147). The 
detachment sight provides leads to the threshold of objectivity, theoria, theoretical truth, 
separation of form form matter through imagination and abstraction, creative thinking and so 
forth. It proves the strict relationship between sight and image faculty.  
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motility assumes the capability to separate the eidos from reality. Once again, the 
problem of Trennung hides itself in the foundations of image faculty. 
We may now get back to the mental side of image faculty. The contents of memory, 
to which imagination applies its power, can also be externalized into real objects: 
pictures. When pictures are perceived, they do not transmit information about the 
imaged object directly, but about its perception, its representation. Picture is 
«externalized memory» (Jonas [2001]: 171), saved either from the everlasting becoming 
of reality or oblivion. It gains an existence that somehow defies time. Moreover, as 
image is «an objectification of individual perception [eine Objectivierung individueller 
Wahrnehmung]», in its translation to picture «it is also made sharable [mitteilbar]» 
(ibidem). The image faculty, indeed, does not get it as a common object, but as an image 
that stands for something else, natural object or intention it may be. The image 
communicates something that enhances knowledge. Making pictures, as a matter of 
fact, means remaking things, and in this process the artist deepens the knowledge he 
has of the object and communicates it to the observers at the same time. Furthermore, 
as long as the homo pictor is able to make things all over again, and to consider them 
freely, he is also the creator of new things. Creativity, indeed, is a gift of the same faculty 
that makes the representation of likeness possible. The same choice, the choice of 
drawing something, «unlocks that dimension of freedom in which faithfulness to the 
original, or to any model, is only one decision» (Jonas [2001]: 172). It opens the gates to 
the «realm of the possible» (ibidem).  
On the contrary, reality is represented as it is, recreated in the image-making activity 
under the criterion of likeness. Thus, the possibility of a comparison between picture and 
imaged object is made possible. Pictorial man discovers truth as one of its own capabilities 
together with creative thought and invention. The same faculty that provides man with the 
power of new, provides it with the power of truth as well. This is not some kind of 
aesthetical truth (e.g. truth in beauty or else), but «the first form of theoretical truth 
[theoretische Wahrheit]», intended as adequacy between mind and reality. The criterion of 
likeness leads directly to the one of adequacy. «The adaequatio imaginis ad rem» 
(ibidem)14 marks the possibility, embodied in man, of relating to objects truthfully. From 
that primitive expression the «verbally descriptive truth» may stem, and this in turn is 
where «scientific truth» (ibidem) originates. However, it is clear that truth (at least in the 
way the word is used here) requires the ability to separate form from matter, and to return 
 
14 
See also Jonas (2001): 175-182. 
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to matter through the light provided by the formal principle. In its relation to truth, the 
image faculty shows once again a connection «to the more fundamental one of separating 
eidos from concrete reality, or form from matter [das fundamentalere Vermögen, das Eidos 
vom Dasein zu trennen, oder die Form vom Stoffe]» (Jonas [2001]: 167).  
In conclusion, it has been observed that the image faculty (representational faculty, 
pictorial faculty) provides man with the ability to refer to a particular object: images. As 
the essence of image lies in its representational function, that is the utterance of a 
likeness, the image faculty consists in the ability to relate to this likeness. Image faculty, 
moreover, can be thought of as being structured on two levels. Firstly, it bears a bodily 
side, the eidetic control of motility, and a quite complicated mental side, which includes 
the most primitive expressions of higher human functions. Secondly, the image faculty 
sustains the ability to behold images, and to make images. Besides, whenever research 
examines more closely the acts, which (just for argument’s sake) are collected within the 
boundaries of this faculty, it finds a constant presence of a different element. Since the 
analysis of image faculty has brought to the border of the more fundamental faculty of 
Trennung, it is critical to clarify the structure of that new element, in order to get a 
proper perspective in evaluating the effective role aesthetics plays in Hans Jonas’ 
anthropology. 
3. Symbol 
Previous observations have shown that the image faculty is not able to stand on its own 
feet. On the contrary, it requires a more fundamental capability. At this point, it would be 
compelling to conduct a thorough analysis of that human act, where the so long sought 
essence of man is very likely located. Jonas, however, is more interested in clarifying the 
attributes of image faculty and spends only a few scattered words on its foundations. 
Nevertheless, an access to this crucial act may still be gained. In fact, during the whole 
essay, Jonas continuously refers to other proper human acts which, in addition to the 
image faculty, express something about the peculiarities of man. Although image faculty 
is preferred to the other human acts, this is no reason to reduce human essence to the 
ability to behold or to make images. A number of other acts are equally worthy of being 
taken as signs of human uniqueness. A closer look at these other «faculties» that, here 
and there, appear in Jonas’ considerations, may allow insight into the existence of a 
common ground to them all. 
It is therefore necessary to weaken the centrality of the image faculty and concentrate 
on occurrences of other interesting human acts. First of all, Jonas repeatedly mentions a 
Fabio Fossa, Vision, Image and Symbol 
pag. 175 
© Firenze University Press • Aisthesis • 2/2015 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
so-called rational faculty [rationales Vermögen]. What does he mean by this? Which are 
the connections between rational and image faculty? The most important occurrence of 
this expression takes place in a very singular moment of Jonas’ essay. At the end of his 
sketch of the image faculty, Jonas goes back to its inner unity and explains how every 
side of the relationship with images is held together by a common principle. Eidetic 
control of motility, and «eidetic control of imagination» (Jonas [2001]: 172) (that is, the 
command that imagination practices on recollected forms) are two different sides of the 
same freedom that characterizes human Mittelbarkeit. They must go together, because 
«without the latter, there would be no rational faculty, but without the former, its 
possession would be futile» (Jonas [2001]: 173). Homo pictor, as a common ancestry 
shared by homo faber15 and homo sapiens, displays the most complete notion of human 
freedom. Let us focus on homo sapiens. The rational faculty seems to be some kind of 
evolution that stems from the eidetic control of imagination. As mentioned, the control 
that imagination has of memories is a formal one, and consists of a powerful exercise of 
abstraction that detaches the recollected forms from their link to reality, thereby having 
them at its own disposal. Thus, it seems that rational capabilities are somehow related to 
abstraction. As abstraction is practised more and more thoroughly, it is possible to 
suppose that human mind improves its skills until it reaches new conquests, e.g. «the 
abstraction of geometrical form and rational concept» (Jonas [2001]: 174). These new 
elements entertain brand new relationships with imagination and memory - though they 
stem there, because they cannot exist without the Trennung of eidos from reality. All 
those are potential consequences of something that originates, primitively and most 
evidently, in the image faculty but is located elsewhere. Furthermore, it may be also 
recalled that the «first form of theoretical truth» (Jonas [2001]: 172), where both 
descriptive and scientific truths are rooted, receives a pictorial baptism. The adaequatio 
intellectus ad rem, essential for the existence of rational faculty, is an advancement from 
the simpler pictorial likeness. Image faculty and rational faculty are strictly connected, 
and at the same time hint at a third pillar on which they both rest. Rational faculty too, 
for the continuity it shares with the image faculty, indicates the power of Trennung as 
the crucial quality of human beings. 
Beside rational faculty, Jonas considers another most peculiar human act, and the 
attention he dedicates to it confirms its importance. Already in the first lines of the essay, 
the image is closely associated to speech [Sprechen], or language [Sprache]. Seeking the 
 
15
 See Jonas (1996): 78-9. Image making and tool production are analogous acts. They both imply 
«an eidetic power of imagination and eidetic control of the hand» and involve imagination. 
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identifying trait of man, Jonas decides to focus on image, though underlining that «no 
claim of exclusive validity is implied in the choice» (Jonas [2001]: 157). Due to its 
primitivism and simplicity, image-making fits the requirements of the criterion better 
than other human acts, e.g. speech. Evidently, an analogy between the two acts is 
supposed. The phenomenon of language, however, is indeed central and characteristic, 
but is far too complex to offer a plain criterion of analysis. Firstly, recognizing a language 
as a language requires abilities that are clearly more complicated than the ones that 
allow the recognition of a likeness. Moreover, the concept of language (as the concept of 
rational itself) has grown too problematic be used properly here. This causes the 
propensity to deal with images, though a reflection upon language keeps arising during 
the analysis of image faculty. «In fact, an understanding of the image faculty may 
contribute something to the understanding of the more elusive phenomenon of speech» 
(Jonas [2001]: 158). Beyond any doubt, a connection between image faculty and 
language is caught in its validity. 
Regarding the substance of this connection, Jonas notices that it insists upon the 
generality images and language both share. Referring to Genesis 2:19, he points out that 
giving names to creatures is «the first distinctively human act» (Jonas [2001]: 173), by 
which man settled his dominance upon the things he named. That act, ordering the 
manifold of creation in fixed classes according to its qualities, marks a «symbolic 
duplication of nature by names [die symbolische Vordoppelung der Welt durch Namen]» 
(ibidem), which is an analogous act in respect to «the remaker of things “in their 
likeness”» (Jonas [2001]: 172) that was already discussed. Indeed, both name and image 
express a generality. They do not stick to individuals. Therefore, «the drawing of the 
image is analogous to the act of calling by names», since they both express «the 
symbolic making-over-again of the world [das symbolische Noch-einmal-machen der 
Welt]» (Jonas [2001]: 173). Of course, they both suppose the performance of a more 
fundamental faculty that assures «the availability of the eidos as an identity over and 
above the particular» (ibidem). This task can only be completed by the faculty of 
Trennung and its own peculiar capability of abstraction, that offers symbols as means to 
constitute a new and unprecedented relationship with the object, a new level of 
Mittelbarkeit peculiar to human beings16.  
The availability of the eidos, that makes the symbolic making-over-again of the world 
 
16
 Cfr. Jonas (2001): 183: «The separation of eidos from reality with which we met in the 
phenomena of “image” and “truth” signifies the passage to a new, critical level of mediacy in the 
relation of organism to environment». 
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possible, works in advantage of «human apprehension, imagination and discourse». 
Image faculty, rational faculty and language are kept together by the common relation to 
what has so far been called the faculty of Trennung, and which we may now define as 
symbolic faculty. The capacity of extracting eide from the flux of reality is then a symbolic 
ability, that defines the essence of man. All these evidences point at the same 
conclusion: «the more-than-animal nature of its creation; (…) his being potentially a 
speaking, thinking, inventing, in short “symbolical” being [ein potentiell sprechendes, 
denkendes, erfindendes, kurz ein “symbolisches” Wesen]» (Jonas [2001]: 158). Image, 
rational thought and language are signs of a unique and more fundamental act, which 
the essence of man consists of: his faculty of symbolic utterance. Indeed, symbolic 
elements are present in every step of image faculty, as well as in language and thought. 
Even vision, as previously underlined, exhibits a symbolic attitude. Firstly, it has been 
shown how vision shares elements of a symbolic function. «Thus each view alike 
represents the object “symbolically” (though as a symbol one view may be superior to 
others [...])». To a certain degree, «symbolism» may be attributed to vision itself. 
Furthermore, the making of images expresses a «symbolic similitude» by the «symbolic 
concentration on the essentials», recognised through the «the capacity of symbolic 
understanding». Out of that utterance-recognition process a «symbolic convention» 
might arise, which is based on the image's most «symbolic aspect», which in turn 
overcomes the real elements of the representative phenomenon. Again, the generality of 
images is based on a symbolic function: «image sensibly symbolizes generality poised 
between the individuality of the imaging thing and that of the imaged object». This 
generality is shared by speech, that is a «symbolic making-over-again of the world», a 
«symbolic duplication of nature by names». Language too, as we know, is a form of 
«symbolic utterance». Even dance is considered an act that displays a symbolism. Hence, 
the «more-than-animal nature» of man consists in his «“symbolical” being» (Jonas 
[2001]: 1158-73). 
Symbolism, that is the ability of separating eidos from reality in order to gain a free 
access to it, is the defining human act, and it determines the peculiar relationship 
between human self and the environment. The anthropological claims, previously 
presented, find here their satisfaction. On the one hand, vision links human beings to 
animal life, proposing an ontological interpretation that avoids any fracture in the realm 
of nature. Along this line, this interpretation displays a continuity based on the arising of 
symbolic abilities. On the other hand, the highest development of abstraction introduces 
a brand new step in the relation of mediacy, which consists in an unprecedented 
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distance from reality, a freedom that allows the self to have objects at his utter disposal, 
thus marking his own differentia specifica from all other living things. Beholding and 
making images, speaking and rationally thinking are different manifestations of this 
unique and essential capability. 
What may then be said about the symbolic faculty and its structure? The symbolic 
faculty seems to recall the architecture of image faculty. There is no wonder in that, of 
course, image faculty being one of its possible expressions. Its structure is also two-
folded. It bears an interpretative and a productive side. In other words, it allows both the 
recognition and the making of symbols. Once again, imagination plays a very important 
role in the process. Since Jonas' essay concentrates on images, the theme of symbolic 
utterance appears in the image phenomenology context. As the artist or the painter 
chooses how to represent something, he chooses from the real model a set of 
characteristic traits, which carries a more communicative potential. During this selection  
̶  that may even turn into alteration  ̶ , the artist explores his freedom from reality,  ̶  and 
instils in his product a new feature, intention. Thus, the traits he selects are different 
from all others due to their symbolic power. As long as an image presents a likeness, it 
presents a «symbolic similitude» (Jonas [2001]: 161). Image is a particular kind of 
symbol, and consequently image faculty is a particular kind of symbolic faculty. Yet the 
way image may symbolize the imaged object can vary significantly along the line of 
human freedom. «There is almost no limit, Jonas says, to the stretch of imagination [die 
Spannweite der Imagination] that the capacity of symbolic understanding [das Vermögen 
symbolischen Verstehen] may command» (Jonas [2001]: 162). 
In order to completely understand this sentence, it is necessary to recall the connection 
between imagination and memory. How imagination works on memory contents, 
abstracting them from the strict bond to actual perception and reality and gaining access 
to the realm of eidos has been previously discussed. At this point, the symbolic faculty 
shows its recognition skills. Thanks to the free movements of imagination, which produce 
symbols by alterations of recollected form or creation of new shapes out of them, the self, 
walking backwards, can solve and understand the riddle of any symbolic representation. 
Hence, the symbolic faculty is the actual principle of many typical human expressions. 
Their fundamental possibility rests on the faculty that provides the performance of 
Trennung. The very act of separating eidos from reality, in order to reach objects freely and 
through innovative perspectives, is the symbolic task, from which both the making and the 
understanding of each types of symbolic utterance derive. 
The reason why terms related to the semantic field of symbolism are constantly 
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present throughout the essay, and why they are so often linked to the anthropological 
discourse, should now have been made clearer. Images, names, and concepts are 
symbols. They are made possible by the symbolic act of separating form from reality and 
maintain a reference to the object through the expression of a likeness of any kind. In 
other words, they represent it. Trennung and representational function are the essential 
elements of the symbolic faculty, and consequently of all its derived aspects. 
4. Homo Pictor, Animal Symbolicum 
At this point in the analysis, some conclusions shall be drawn. First of all, it has been 
shown that Jonas' anthropology ought not be primarily considered as an aesthetical 
theory of man. The homo pictor ought not be taken as the whole truth about the 
essence of humanity. Image faculty, speech, technology and rational faculty are possible 
advancements of a unique and more fundamental capability, which exclusively 
characterises man among all other living things: his power of symbolic act. Even before 
being a homo pictor, then, man is an animal symbolicum17. Indeed, man shares with 
animal, or better with life in general, a relationship between the self and the 
environment, the so-called Mittelbarkeit. More precisely, vision connects higher animals 
to mankind, by which is knowingly assumed and exercised the symbolic function at work 
in vision as an unconscious automatism. Nevertheless, this natural continuity ought not 
be thought as being totally uniform, whereas different levels of mediacy mean different 
potentialities, freedoms, abilities; in short, different beings regarding to their essence. 
Nonetheless, aesthetical themes occupy a certain role in Jonas' reflection. Human 
aesthetical abilities, Jonas argues, represent the field in which something about man 
may be revealed, but not the very truth they communicate. This truth rests somewhere 
else, i.e., in the human availability of symbolic utterance. This very peculiar act 
determines human essence, the degree of freedom in respect to the «importunity of 
environment» (Jonas [2001]: 170) that characterizes human life. The act of 
understanding and making images discloses the essence of humanity in the simplest, 
most unmistakeable and brightest possible way. The study of the relationship between 
man and image inevitably leads to some thesis of aesthetical sort. The most interesting 
among them may be the thorough analysis of sense perception, that is to say, whether 
aesthetics can be understood in line with its Greek etymology (aisthesis). Perhaps, Jonas' 
work can represent a solid starting point from which the traditional claim of aesthetics as 
 
17 
Cfr. Halawa (2011); Ulama (2011). 
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gnoseologia inferior18 can be reconsider. Moreover, the interpretation of image, and the 
odd absence of any reference to beauty, may offer some ideas concerning the status of 
beauty and its meaning in the work of art. Nevertheless, Jonas' attention to aesthetical 
themes is evidently poor, or at least totally indirect. Jonas considers aesthetics as a 
means towards something else. In his theory of man, he tries to reach an end that has 
very little to do with aesthetics, if nothing at all19. 
By means of this new theory of man, in fact, Jonas is aiming at two results. First of all, 
as previously mentioned, his comparison between ancient Gnosticism and modern 
philosophy of existence has guided him to the need of an anthropology that could satisfy 
an ontological interpretation based on a natural monism respectful of man’s peculiarity. 
Secondly, Jonas seizes here the opportunity to further expand a theory of cultural 
products that made his great synthesis of Gnosticism possible. The signs on this subject 
are too evident to be ignored. As previously remarked, Jonas describes the symbolizing 
process as an objectification [Objectivierung], and the theory of cultural products he 
sketches in Appendix I of Augustine und das paulinische Freiheitsproblem, and in Gnosis 
und spätantiker Geist is indeed founded on the concept of Objectivation20. The symbolic 
essence of human beings, as indicated by the image faculty, provides his speculation 
about the origin and the development of human cultural expressions with an 
anthropological basis which is in turn strictly connected to an ontological perspective. 
The methodological premises, on which Jonas worked since the late twenties, allowed 
him firstly to approach Gnosticism as a set of expressions kept together by a single 
existential principle. These premises gain now a systematic foundation through an 
original interpretation of life and being that is finally able to settle with Heidegger’s 
philosophy of existence and stand by itself. So, if this interpretation looks acceptable, 
attention should probably focus on the connections between the essay on the homo 
pictor and the theory of Objectivation, with particular emphasis on the shifting from the 
 
18 
Cfr. Baumgarten, Kant (2008): 38: «Obi. 5) confusio mater erroris. Rsp. a) sed conditio, sine qua 
non, inveniendae veritatis, ubi natura non facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem. Ex nocte 
per auroram meridies. b) Ideo curanda est confusio, ne inde errores, quot e quanti penes 
incurio<os>s, c) non commendatur confusio, sed cognitio emendatur, quatenus illi necessario 
admixtum est aliquid confusionis». On Baumgarten's aesthetics, see Amoroso (2000). Under these 
regards see also Yaffe (2008); Campo (2011). 
19 
Cfr. Jonas (2001): 181: Aesthetic considerations upon images are evidently left aside, for the 
benefit of epistemological and theoretical perspectives. Nonetheless, several match points may 
be found between Jonas' philosophy and aesthetics or theory of contemporary art: See 
Hohnsträter (2007). 
20 
For further information about the theory of cultural products, cfr. Bonaldi (2007). 
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heideggerian framework to an independent way of thinking based on the analysis of the 
phenomenon of life. However, this does not exclude the fact that aesthetics may find in 
his works a very interesting and stimulating interlocutor. Although aesthetical themes do 
not play an extraordinary role in Jonas' philosophy, his reflections could recommend new 
suggestions in order to conceive the exact contribution that sense perception and the 
act of making symbols might offer to the clarification of aesthetical experiences. 
Additionally, aesthetical thinkers could find in Jonas' work an opportunity to further 
reflect on the different meanings of the discipline, particularly as concerns its connection 
with other fields of knowledge such as anthropology, epistemology and ontology21. 
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